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Sweet Vindication: The Second
Circuit Strikes a Blow to Companies
That Use Class-Action Waivers in
Arbitration Agreements to Avoid the
Law
In re American Express Merchants' Litigation'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is easy to see why a company might want to limit a plaintiffs ability to
bring a class-action suit. Class actions, after all, expose defendants to substantial
damage awards for relatively minor infractions, 2 and due to the relative ease of
joining a class action lawsuit, lead to far more plaintiffs than there would be oth-
erwise were plaintiffs forced to bring lawsuits on an individual basis. It is unsur-
prising, then, that many companies have begun to include class action waivers in
their binding arbitration agreements.4 These waivers force potential plaintiffs to
bring arbitration claims on an individual basis instead of as a class.5 Many courts
have upheld these waivers, holding that to do otherwise would narrow the applica-
tion of the Federal Arbitration Act.6
Other scholars and courts have concluded that when a class action waiver
prevents a plaintiff from vindicating his statutory rights, that waiver should be
unenforceable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took this ap-
proach in In re American Express Merchants' Litigation. The court, however,
was careful to point out that these class-action waivers should not be considered
unenforceable per se, but that courts must examine each waiver on a case-by-case
basis. This note will examine the court's reasoning and will discuss what courts
and Congress should do to protect consumers when companies use class-action
waivers to avoid liability when they break the law.
1. 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009).
2. Daniel R. Higginbotham, Note, Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver Clause
Presents a Gloomy Future for Consumers, 58 DUKE L.J. 103, 111 (2008).
3. F. Paul Bland, Jr. & Claire Prestel, Challenging Class Action Bans in Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLicr RESOL. 369, 381-82 (2009).
4. Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2000).
5. Id.
6. See Gay v. Creditinform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007); Bommer v. At&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404
(7th Cir. 2002).
7. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009).
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I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2003, a group of merchants came together in an attempt to bring a class-
action lawsuit against American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.
(Amex). The proposed class consisted of "all merchants that have accepted
American Express charge cards . . . and have thus been forced to agree to accept
American Express credit and debit cards . . . ."
The plaintiffs claimed that Amex charged merchants significantly higher
"merchant discount fees" than other popular credit card companies. These mer-
chants originally agreed to pay the higher fees charged by Amex because Amex
centered its business on the issuance of corporate and personal charge cards used
by affluent people who spend relatively large amounts of money." The plaintiffs
grew to resent these higher fees because Amex began to issue new credit cards to
college students, young adults, and others who perhaps did not justify the higher
fees charged by Amex.12 Due to the nature of the agreement between the mer-
chants and Amex, the plaintiffs were compelled to honor all cards issued by Amex
and to pay the same high fees for each purchase, regardless of the type of card
being used.13 The plaintiffs contended that this "amount[ed] to an illegal 'tying
arrangement,' in violation" of [the Sherman Act]. 14
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the contract between the merchants and
Amex not only compelled arbitration but also contained a class action waiver. 5
The plaintiffs would not have taken issue with the mandatory arbitration clause if
it had allowed for class arbitration.' The plaintiffs brought their suit as a class
action because the damages that each merchant could anticipate would not justify
the cost.17 They argued that "enforcement of the class action waiver would effec-
8. Id. at 304-05.
9. Id. at 305. The plaintiffs in the suit included California and New York corporations that operated
businesses that have contracted with Amex and the National Supermarkets Association, Inc. (NSA), "a
voluntary membership-based trade association that represents the interests of independently owned
supermarkets." Id.
10. Id. at 307-08. According to the plaintiffs, these fees are at least thirty-five percent higher than the
rates of credit card companies such as Visa, MasterCard, and Discover. Id. at 308.
I1. Id. at 307.
12. Id. at 308.
13. Id.
14. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege this violates section I of the Sherman Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2006). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals made clear in its decision that it would not take a
position on the merits of the case. In re Am. Express, 554 F.3d at 305 ("And, needless to say, we take
no position on the merits of these claims.").
15. In re Am. Express, 554 F.3d at 306. The relevant clause in the arbitration agreement reads:
If arbitration is chosen by any party with respect to a claim, neither you nor we will have the
right to litigate that claim in court or have a jury trial on that claim . . . . Further, you will not
have the right to participate in a representative capacity or as a member of any class of claimants
pertaining to any claim subject to arbitration. The arbitrator's decision will be final and binding.
Id.
16. See id. at 310.
17. This damage estimate was calculated by an economist who stated that:
[A] small merchant with $10 million of annual sales, on average, might calculate and expect
$754 of economic damages for the year 2001, which is roughly the midpoint of the damage pe-
riod covered by this litigation . ... Multiplying the $754 damage figure by four, gives a rough
estimate of $3,015 total damages for the whole four-year damage period, or $9,046 when trebled,
assuming that the merchant's sales remain constant at $10 million for the four-year period.
176 [Vol. 2010
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tively strip [the plaintiffs] of the ability to assert their claims because" the costs
associated with bringing a lawsuit would far outweigh the potential reward.' 8 To
counter the plaintiffs' argument, Amex contended that the plaintiffs, their attor-
neys, and their experts "could reach an agreement as to how the experts' cost of
preparation could be shared," and thus lower the total cost for each plaintiff.' 9
The district court agreed with Amex, and determined that, under the Clayton
Act,2o each merchant could recover threefold damages and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 21 Despite this, the District Court held that
"the enforceability of the collection action waivers is a claim for the arbitrator to
resolve."22 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
district court, holding that although class action waivers are not unenforceable per
se, the waiver in this case was unenforceable because it would effectively bar the
plaintiffs from bringing suit against Amex.23
El. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)24 was enacted in 1925 "to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitra-
tion agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."25 In the instant deci-
sion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledges the expression of "a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute reso-
lution."26 This policy is tempered by the fact, though, that enhancing the federal
policy favoring arbitration is largely a matter of "mak[ing] arbitration agreements
as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."27 The U.S. Supreme Court
illustrated this point in Perry v. Thomas,28 for example, by stating that a court may
not construe an arbitration agreement in a different way than it construes other
contracts under state law.29 The opinion went on to say that a court cannot "rely
on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding
that enforcement would be unconscionable." 30
Id. at 317.
18. Id. at 308. An expert that testified for the plaintiffs, for instance, estimated that the total cost for
an individual plaintiff to bring action against Amex to resolve this controversy would be at least sever-
al hundred thousand dollars, and could cost as much as one million dollars. Id. at 317.
19. Id. at 318. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not buy this argument, though, because a
separate clause in the arbitration agreement specifies that an individual plaintiff cannot share any
information relating to an arbitration with anyone. Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
21. In re Am. Express, 554 F.3d at 309.
22. Id. at 309.
23. Id. at 304.
24. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
25. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
26. In re Am. Express, 554 F.3d at 311 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Swiss Reinsur-
ance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2001)).
27. Id. (quoting Opals on Ice Lingerie v. Bodylines, Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 369 (2d Cir. 2003)) (altera-
tion in original) (emphasis in original).
28. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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The FAA can be said to offer only "minimalist guidance" to class arbitration 31
due to the fact that class arbitration in the United States has existed for only ap-
proximately twenty-five years.32 The first known case in the United States to
address class arbitration is Keating v. Superior Court.33 In that case, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals found that there was "no insurmountable obstacle to con-
ducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis." 34 Since then, the process of class
arbitration has become more standardized "through the creation of several sets of
specialized arbitral rules." 35
While the U.S. Supreme Court has never ordered parties to proceed in class
arbitration, it could be said to have implicitly permitted class arbitration in Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.36 In Bazzle, the Supreme Court was asked to de-
cide whether an arbitration agreement that was silent as to class arbitration impli-
citly allowed the plaintiffs to proceed in class arbitration.37 In a plurality decision,
the Court held that because the parties had agreed to submit to an arbitrator "all
disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to" the contract, it was
up to an arbitrator, and not a court, to decide whether the contract allowed for
class arbitration. 38 After Bazzle, it is not surprising that many companies revised
their standard arbitration agreements "to expressly prohibit class arbitration." 39 In
fact, this was foreseen by Justice Stevens during oral arguments, where he stated
that Bazzle would have no future significance because "isn't it fairl clear that all
the arbitration agreements in the future will prohibit class actions?"
The Supreme Court has not yet directly faced the question of whether there
are conditions under which an arbitration agreement that contains a class action
waiver would be incompatible with the FAA. 41 The Supreme Court has, however,
provided some guidance on the conditions that need to be met in order to invali-
date an arbitration agreement due to excessive costs. In Green Tree Financial
31. Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral Power
and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 335 (2004) (citing Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R.
Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 178-
79 (2002).
32. S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating International Enforceable
Awards When Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. I.
INT'L L. 1017, 1018 (2009).
33. Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), vacated, 645 P.2d 1192
(Cal. 1982), rev'd in part, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Sternlight, supra note 4, at
38.
34. Keating, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
35. Strong, supra note 32, at 1026 (referring to the American Arbitration Association's Supplemen-
tary Rules for Class Arbitration, JAMS Class Action Procedures, and the National Arbitration Forum's
Class Action Procedures).
36. 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbi-
tration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2006).
37. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447.
38. Id. at 448, 451-52.
39. Laurence Z. Shiekman, Stephen S. Harvey, & Angelo A. Stio, fI, Another Federal Circuit
Knocks Out Class Action Waiver Provisions in an Arbitration Agreement Based on Public Policy
Under Federal Antitrust Laws, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 169, 169 (2008).
40. Elizabeth M. Avery, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: Class Actions and the Future of
Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, 19 ANTETRUST 24, 26 (2004) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument,
Greentree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, No. 02-634, 2003 WL 1989562 at *55 (Apr. 22, 2003)).
41. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 2009).
178 (Vol. 2010
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Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,4 2 the Supreme Court addressed "whether an arbitra-
tion agreement that does not mention arbitration costs and fees is unenforceable
because it fails to affirmatively protect a party from potentially steep arbitration
costs." 43 In upholding the petitioner's motion to compel arbitration, the Supreme
Court held that a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the
ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive bears the burden of
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied this principle to
class action waivers in arbitration agreements in the case In re Cotton Yarn Anti-
trust Litigation.45 In that case, purchasers of cotton and poly-cotton yarn brought
action "alleging that [yarn] manufacturers had engaged in a price-fixing conspira-
cy in violation of the Sherman Act." 46 All of the arbitration clauses at issue in the
case prevented multiple plaintiffs from joining their claims against the defen-
dants.47 The court found that the plaintiffs in the case did not establish how much
money it would cost to bring a suit individually against the defendants. 48 It also
declared that the burden of showing that the terms of an arbitration agreement
preclude a plaintiff from vindicating her statutory rights "is a substantial one and
cannot be satisfied by a mere listing of ways that the arbitration proceeding will
differ from a court proceeding, or by speculation about difficulties that might arise
in arbitration."49 The court held that the arbitration agreements in this case were
enforceable because, while bringing arbitration claims individually could be pro-
hibitively expensive in some situations, the plaintiffs failed to establish that this
was the case for them. 50
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion
in Pleasants v. American Express Co.5 1 In that case, the plaintiff brought a suit on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleging that American Express had
violated the Truth in Lending Act.52 American Express moved to compel arbitra-
tion on an individual basis, but the plaintiff argued that the contract's class action
waiver was unconscionable.53 The court disagreed, stating that if the plaintiffs
42. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id. at 91-92. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the respondent did not meet this burden
due to the fact that she relied on "unfounded assumptions" that could not provide the basis "to ascer-
tain the actual costs and fees to which she would be subject in arbitration." Id. at 90 n.6.
45. 505 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2007).
46. Id. at 277.
47. Id. at 283.
48. Id. at 285 ("The plaintiffs in this case developed no evidentiary record below establishing how
much it would cost to proceed individually against each defendant or how those increased costs would
affect their ability to proceed in arbitration. The absence of an evidentiary record on this issue leaves
us with mere speculation about the actual cost of individual proceedings and something little better
than a wild guess about the ability of the corporate plaintiffs to bear those speculative costs.").
49. Id. at 286-87 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 293.
51. 541 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
52. Id. at 855. See generally Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1-4) (2006).
53. Pleasants, 541 F.3d at 857. The plaintiff argued that the contract was:
substantively unconscionable because claims of this type 'involve small recoveries for which
consumers are unlikely to arbitrate absent the class device,' and procedurally unconscionable be-
cause AEIS had superior bargaining power, presented the arbitration clause on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis, and did not send the agreement to Pleasants until after she had completed the surveys.
179No. 1]
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were successful, the Truth in Lending Act allowed the plaintiffs to win the costs
of the action and a reasonable attorney's fee.54 Therefore, despite the fact that the
amount in question for each plaintiff was very small, the court held that because
the plaintiffs could recover the costs of arbitration, the class action waiver in the
arbitration agreement was not unconscionable. 5
Class action waivers in arbitration agreements are also sometimes upheld on
the grounds of federal preemption. 56 In what some have considered a "surprise
victory" for corporate defendants,57 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit went further than the Eighth or Fourth Circuits in upholding a class action
waiver in Gay v. CreditInform.58 In its decision, the court stated that the right to a
class action is "'merely a procedural one"' and that "the right 'may be waived.' 5 9
The court went on to hold that the FAA preempted state law, and that federal
courts could not use unconscionability standards to modify arbitration agree-
ments.6 Furthermore, the court pointed out that even if this obstacle could be
overcome, because the plaintiff had not been misled or coerced into accepting the
arbitration agreement, there was no procedural unconscionability and therefore the
61class action waiver should still be upheld.
The court in Boomer v. AT&T Corp.62 also used the concept of federal
preemption to uphold a class action waiver. In that case, the plaintiff attempted to
bring a class action lawsuit against AT&T because AT&T allegedly overcharged
its customers for contributions to the federal Universal Services Fund.63 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit proved to be another court "unmoved by
arguments that an arbitration clause lacks minimal fairness"64 by declaring the
Federal Communications Act65 preempted state laws of unconscionability.66 The
court reasoned that the purpose of the act was to create uniform rates throughout
the country; if in some states arbitration clauses are stricken as unconscionable or
illegal under those states' consumer protection laws-whereas in other states such
Id.
54. Id. at 859 ("In this case, Pleasants's total recovery of attorney's fees, costs, and statutory damag-
es of $2000 would likely exceed the costs of pursuing her claim."). The court also found that the class-
action waiver was very clear, and therefore was not procedurally unconscionable.
55. Id.
56. For a broader discussion on this point, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability,
and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formal-
ism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 757, 799 (2004).
57. See Bland & Prestel, supra note 3, at 389.
58. 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007).
59. Id. at 392 (quoting Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000)).
60. See id. at 395. In its decision, the Third Circuit rejected the holdings of two Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court decisions which declared that the inclusion of a waiver to bring a judicial class action in an
arbitration agreement was unenforceable and unconscionable. In rejecting these holdings, the Third
Circuit reasoned that because these waivers did not exist "upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract" pursuant to section 2 of the FAA, courts could not prevent
the enforcement of these arbitration provisions. Id. at 394-95.
61. See id. at 395.
62. 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002).
63. Id. at 408.
64. See Stempel, supra note 56, at 765.
65. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a) (2006).
66. AT&T, 309 F.3d at 418-19, 421, 423; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a).
180 [Vol. 2010
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provisions are validated-the rates could be different throughout the country.67
Without considering whether the arbitration claims at issue were unconscionable,
the Seventh Circuit held that the Communications Act implicitly preempted state
laws of unconscionability because to rule otherwise would defeat the purpose of
the act.68
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ele-
venth Circuit, in Dale v. Comcast Corp.,69 did not even consider federal preemp-
tion.70 In that case, subscribers of the cable television provider Comcast at-
tempted to bring a class action lawsuit because they felt Comcast was overcharg-
ing for various franchise fees.7' Each plaintiff, though, had previously signed a
contract containing a mandatory arbitration clause that included a class action
waiver.72 After considering the fact that each plaintiff could potentially recover
only a small amount of money and that attorneys' fees could only be awarded
upon a showing of bad faith, the court held that the class action waiver in the con-
tract was unconscionable because it prevented the plaintiffs from enforcing their
statutory rights under the Cable Act' S73 franchise fee provisions. 74 The court ad-
mitted that while it used an unconscionability standard to rule that the class action
waiver in this case was unenforceable, it was persuaded by the reasoning of cases
that used a vindication of statutory rights standard.
The vindication of statutory rights standard helped the the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit decide Kristian v. Comcast Corp.76 In that case, cus-
tomers of the cable provider attempted to form a class in order to bring suit
against Comcast for violating antitrust laws.77 In order to make its decision in this
case, the First Circuit relied upon the principle that the legitimacy of the arbitral
forum "rests on 'the presumption that arbitration provides a fair and adequate
mechanism for enforcing statutory rights."' The court held that without the
availability of class-wide arbitration or litigation, 79 the plaintiffs could not vindi-
cate their statutory rights.so While the court based its decision on the vindication,
67. AT&T, 309 F.3d. at 418-19.
68. Id. at 421, 423.
69. 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007).
70. Id. at 1224.
71. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1218, 1220. The plaintiffs claimed that Comcast overcharged each of them
$10.56 in excess fees over a four year period. Id. at 1220.
72. Id. at 1218.
73. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2006).
74. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1224.
75. Id.
76. 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
77. Id. at 29. The plaintiffs alleged that Comcast illegally traded customers with its competitors. Id.
at 30.
78. Id. at 54 (quoting Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st
Cir. 1999).
79. Id. (noting that the "mandatory arbitration regime" created by the arbitration provision in ques-
tion "effectively forecloses the use of any class-based mechanism").
80. Id. at 54-55. ("[Eiach putative class member's estimated recovery-assuming the damage award
was trebled pursuant to the applicable antitrust statute-would range from a few hundred dollars to
perhaps a few thousand dollars. By contrast, the expert fees alone are estimated to be in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars; and attorney's fees could reach into the millions of dollars."). The court noted
that each class member's award would be not greater than a few thousand dollars while the agent fees
would be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars and attorney's fees potentially in the millions of
dollars. Id. at 54.
No. 1] 181
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of statutory rights, it points out the vast similarities between this analysis and an
unconscionability analysis.8 ' In fact, the court states that because it found that
class arbitration could proceed using a vindication of statutory rights analysis, it
did not feel that it was necessary to proceed with an unconscionability analysis at
all.82
There is clearly a split among the Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the
standards used to determine whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agree-
ment should be enforced. The Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Eighth,
Third, and Seventh Circuits appear to be more likely to enforce these waivers,
while the Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and First Circuits appear to be less
likely to enforce them. In In re American Express Merchants' Litigation,83 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit aligned itself with the Eleventh and First
Circuits in holding that the class action waiver at issue was unenforceable. 84
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The issue before the Second Circuit in In re American Express Merchants'
Litigation (hereinafter, American Express) was whether a mandatory class action
waiver provision contained in an arbitration clause should be enforceable." The
court began its opinion by stating that "it is difficult to overstate the strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration . . . ."86 It later tempered this by stating that, while
arbitration agreements are as enforceable as other contracts, they are not more
so. The court supported this proposition by quoting from section 2 of the FAA,
which provides that an agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."88
The court also pointed out that the Supreme Court has recognized that class
actions can serve as a vehicle for vindicating statutory rights.89 The court addi-
tionally stated that the availability of class actions is especially important when a
large group of individuals or entities has suffered an alleged wrong that is too
small to justify bringing individual actions.90 The court illustrated this point by
quoting from a Seventh Circuit case that stated, "[T]he realistic alternative to a
class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.00."91 In American Express, the court found that
the plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated that the costs associated with bringing
an individual suit against Amex would prevent the plaintiffs from vindicating their
81. Id. at 63-64.
82. Id. at 64.
83. 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009).
82. Id. at 320.
85. Id. at 302.
86. Id. (quoting Arciniago v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006)).
87. Id. at 311-12.
88. Id. at 312 (quoting the F.A.A., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
89. Id. at 312.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 313 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
182 [Vol. 2010
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statutory rights.92 The court followed the First Circuit's decision in Kristian93 in
declaring that because the class action waiver prevented the plaintiffs from vindi-
cating their statutory rights, the waiver was unenforceable.94
While the court recognized the importance of class action suits, it goes out of
its way to stress that the holding of this case does not make class action waivers in
arbitration agreements unenforceable per se, or even unenforceable per se in the
context of antitrust actions. 95 Instead, the court points out that because the FAA
favors arbitration agreements, each case must be considered "on its own merits." 96
The court also made it clear that it analyzed class action waivers through a
lens focused upon vindication of statutory rights, instead of unconscionability. 97
The court pointed out that for this type of analysis, it is not necessary to show the
relative size of the merchant plaintiffs compared to Amex.98 Instead, the court
reasoned, if any individual plaintiff could demonstrate that the potential recovery
would be too small to justify the expenditure of bringing an individual action, a
class action waiver would be unenforceable.9
In this case, the court found that enforcing the class action waiver in the con-
tract would leave the plaintiffs without a reasonably feasible means of recovery
and would therefore grant Amex "de facto immunity from antitrust liability;"
because of this, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the class action
waiver in the card acceptance agreement could not be enforced.
V. COMMENT
The crux of this case rests on the balance between the ability of the plaintiffs
to vindicate statutory rights on one hand with the willingness of courts to enforce
contractual agreements on the other. In American Express, the Second Circuit
essentially held that when a ban on class arbitration prevents a plaintiff from vin-
dicating statutory rights, the original agreement banning class arbitration should
92. Id. at 318-19. The plaintiffs hired an economist to provide an expert opinion about the likely
costs associated with a potential lawsuit against Amex. Id. at 316. He determined that "due to the
complexity and analytical intensity of an antitrust study, total expert fees and expenses usually are
substantial . . . rang[ing] from about $300 thousand to more than $2 million." Id. The economist went
on to conclude that the total damages for each plaintiff was only approximately $3,015, and only
$9,046 when trebled. Id. at 317.
93. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
94. In re Am. Express, 554 F.3d at 304, 311.
95. Id. at 321.
96. Id. The court lists relevant circumstances as "the fairness of the provisions, the cost to an indi-
vidual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiffs potential recovery, the ability
to recover attorneys' fees and other costs . . ., the practical affect [sic] the waiver will have on a com-
pany's ability to engage in unchecked market behavior, and related public policy concerns." Id. (quot-
ing Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007)).
97. Id. at 320.
98. Id. The courts emphasized this point in part because the plaintiffs repeatedly refer to themselves
as "small merchants." The court agreed with Amex that the plaintiffs did this because they hoped to
benefit from a line of cases "where individual consumers have alleged that arbitration agreements were
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not be enforced. Both the Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, though, have taken opposite views.' 0
This is an important issue because of the prevalence of these agreements.
One study has shown that over thirty percent of arbitration agreements contain
class action waivers.' 02 Some argue that companies use arbitration clauses to
insulate themselves entirely from class action liability. 03  By upholding these
clauses despite finding that they deny plaintiffs the right to vindicate their statuto-
ry rights, courts are helping these companies avoid important laws.
These courts' decisions also run counter to the idea put forth by the Supreme
Court that the class action is a vehicle for vindicating statutory rights, especially
when the damages due to any single individual are too small to justify bringing an
individual action.'0 The Supreme Court, for instance, stated a class action may
motivate plaintiffs "to bring cases that for economic reasons might not be brought
otherwise . . . [thereby] vindicating the rights of individuals who otherwise might
not consider it worth the candle to embark on litigation in which the optimum
result might be more than consumed by the cost." 05 Because of this general prin-
ciple that class actions help consumers to vindicate their statutory rights, the
courts should not allow companies to avoid them in binding arbitration agree-
ments.
Furthermore, class actions serve an important deterrent effect. Even if indi-
vidual plaintiffs choose to bring small claims against large defendants through
arbitration, "a statute's deterrent purpose is not served if a company obtains mil-
lions in profit from its illegal activity and balances that profit against only one or
two awards of a few thousand dollars." 0 6 Without the fear of plaintiffs bringing
class action lawsuits, companies will be more likely to break the law and hurt
consumers. Myriam Gilles, a professor at the Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva
University, states that "many prudent corporate decisions are made precisely be-
cause the palpable threat of class action liability hangs in the boardroom." 07 She
goes on to say that "allowing companies to simply opt out of exposure to collec-
tive litigation is no more defensible than a system in which corporations may de-
cide whether they wish to be exposed to federal antitrust, securities, or civil rights
laws." 08
101. See Gay v. Creditinform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007); Bommer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404
(7th Cir. 2002).
102. See linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, Volunteering to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 65
(2004).
103. See Stemlight, supra note 4, at 5-6 (arguing that it would be wrong to allow companies to use
arbitration clauses to shield themselves from class actions); see also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of
Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modem Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373,
397 (2005) ("This movement accelerated in 1999, when the National Arbitration Forum ("NAP'), a
for-profit arbitral body designated in the arbitration provisions of many large companies, disseminated
marketing materials cautioning corporate attorneys that the only way to insulate their clients from class
action liability in general-and Y2K computer class action liability in particular-was to implement
arbitration provisions containing terms that expressly waive the right to class treatment." (citation
omitted)).
104. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 312 (2nd Cir. 2009).
105. See Deposit Guarantee Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980).
106. See Bland & Prestel, supra note 3, at 379.
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The Second Circuit's decision in American Express did not outright forbid
companies from including class action waivers in their arbitration agreements.
Instead, American Express held that class action waivers were not unenforceable
per se.110 Because of this, courts are left in the position of deciding whether these
bans prevent the plaintiff from vindicating his or her statutory rights on a case-by-
case basis. Leaving this decision to individual courts leads to conflicts and circuit
splits. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Pleasants v. American Exp. Co."' particu-
larly stands out as being in conflict with the Second Circuit's decision in Ameri-
can Express because both cases involve the same defendant.
Both courts examined the potential awards that the plaintiffs could win
through individual arbitration; the Second Circuit concluded that the potential for
the plaintiffs to be awarded the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney's fee
were enough to vindicate the statutory rights of the plaintiffs,' 12 while the Second
Circuit found that they were not enough.1 3 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Eighth
Circuit failed to consider that fees paid to expert witnesses might not be reim-
bursed to the plaintiffs, or might be reimbursed at inadequate levels.114  The
Eighth Circuit also failed to consider the fact pointed out in American Express that
although attorneys' fees would be awarded if the plaintiff wins the arbitration, an
attorney risks being paid nothing if the plaintiff loses, and fewer lawyers would
therefore be willing to commit to working on the case. 15 It is inevitable that leav-
ing these decisions to individual courts, even if they are using the same standards,
will produce different results.
Though declaring class action waivers in arbitration agreements to be unen-
forceable per se would solve this problem, this would probably run afoul of Su-
preme Court precedent." 6 The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Perry v. Thomas,"7
for instance, that a court may not construe an arbitration agreement in a different
way than it construes other contracts under state law." Furthermore, declaring
class action waivers unconscionable per se would be counter to the general con-
tract principle that "terms may be unconscionable in some contexts but not in
others."' 19
Furthermore, under the FAA, state legislatures do not have the power to indi-
vidually declare that class action waivers are unenforceable per se.120 Section 2 of
the FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and
108. In re Am. Express, 554 F.3d at 321.
110. Id.
111. 541 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
112. Id. at 859.
113. In re Am. Express, 554 F.3d at 318.
114. Id. (stating that in an antitrust case, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court is
bound by the limit of 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), which is currently set at a $40 per diem.).
115. Id.
116. See Federal Statutes and Regulations: C. Federal Arbitration Act, 117 HARv. L. REV. 410, 417-
18 (2003) ("because the FAA sought to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as any other con-
tract, state courts are not free to declare any and every [no class action arbitration clause] unconsciona-
ble").
117. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
118. Id. at 492 n.9.
119. See Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 116, at 417 (quoting the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. e (1981)).
120. See Higginbotham, supra note 2, at 119-120.
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enforceable,"I 21 and the Supreme Court has been consistently expansive "with
respect to section 2's effect upon state law." 22 Because the Supreme Court has
held that the FAA preempts state law, courts would find that "federal law
preempts any state legislation providing consumers with a right to class arbitration
or prohibiting companies from including waiver clauses in arbitration agree-
ments."l 23
Because neither courts nor individual state legislatures have the power to dec-
lare bans on class action waivers in arbitration agreements to be unenforceable per
se, and because many courts have enforced class action waivers despite the fact
that they would leave the plaintiffs without a practical way to vindicate their statu-
tory rights, legislative reform is needed.
Jean R. Sternlight, a professor at the University of Nevada's William S. Boyd
School of Law, argues that legislation is needed "to prevent companies from using
binding arbitration clauses to eliminate class actions entirely, to the extent we
decide it would be undesirable to allow companies to insulate themselves from
class action, and to the extent that courts fail to accept the statutory and contrac-
tual arguments set forth in this article or elsewhere."' Others argue that amend-
ing the FAA to ban prospective class action waivers is particularly important be-
cause "even where courts are inclined to find the clauses unconscionable or a
burden on the vindication of statutory rights, the parties seeking invalidation still
bear the burden of proof."1 Even in American Express, for instance, the plain-
tiffs had to hire an economist to prove to the court that the potential reward an
individual could receive in an arbitration hearing would be less than the costs of
bringing the claim in the first place.126 Placing this burden on the plaintiffs un-
doubtedly prevents many from bringing claims in the first place.
Sternlight argues that if Congress is unwilling to go as far as banning class
action waivers in arbitration agreements entirely, it should at the very least bar
"the elimination of class actions in those cases where plaintiffs have no feasible
alternative by which to present their claim." 27 While this would not make class
121. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id.
122. See Robert S. Safi, Beyond Unconscionability: Preserving the Class Mechanism Under State
Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1715, 1722 (2005) (summarizing holdings
from three Supreme Court cases: Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
(holding that the FAA applies in diversity cases, notwithstanding that it sets forth substantive law);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the FAA applies in state courts); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that the FAA's reach is coextensive
with Congress's Commerce Clause power)).
123. Higginbotham, supra note 2, at 119-20.
124. See Sternlight, supra note 4, at 122.
125. See Richard A. Bales & Sue Iron, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1097 (2009).
126. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 319 (2d Cir. 2009).
127. See Sternlight, supra note 4, at 124.
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action waivers unenforceable per se, it would at least bring all of the federal courts
in line with the Second Circuit's decision in American Express.
American Express, then, represents a minimal threshold of how courts should
interpret class action waivers in arbitration agreements. If future courts follow the
Second Circuit's reasoning, then it will be easier for plaintiffs to proceed on a
class-wide basis despite arbitration agreements that contain class action waivers.
Consumers will be better protected from companies that are using class action
waivers in order to defraud their customers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In declaring a class action waiver that prevents plaintiffs from vindicating sta-
tutory rights unenforceable in American Express, the Second Circuit has struck a
blow to companies wishing to avoid consumer protection laws by including class
action waivers in arbitration agreements. The court also reiterated the previously
recognized deterrent effects that potential class action lawsuits have on compa-
nies. Unfortunately, some courts uphold class action waivers even when they
keep plaintiffs from vindicating statutory rights; others fail to take into account all
of the costs and risks associated with bringing lawsuits when determining if a ban
truly prevents plaintiffs from vindicating statutory rights. Because courts cannot
rule these bans to be unenforceable per se, Congress should act in order to create a
uniform standard that protects consumers and prevents a company's ability to
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